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Abstract
We consider the distributed access enforcement problem for Role-Based Access Control
(RBAC) systems. Such enforcement has become important with RBACs increasing adop-
tion, and the proliferation of data that needs to be protected. Our particular interest is in
the evaluation of a new data structure that has recently been proposed for enforcement:
the Cascade Bloom Filter. The Cascade Bloom Filter is an extension of the Bloom filter,
and provides for time- and space-efficient encodings of sets. We compare the Cascade
Bloom Filter to the Bloom Filter, and another approach called Authorization Recycling
that has been proposed for distributed access enforcement in RBAC. One of the challenges
we address is the lack of a benchmark: we propose and justify a benchmark for the as-
sessment. Also, we adopt a statistically rigorous approach for empirical assessment from
recent work. We present our results for time- and space-efficiency based on our benchmark.
We demonstrate that, of the three data structures that we consider, the Cascade Bloom
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Access control is the provision of regulated accesses to resources by principals. It is one of
the most important aspects of security; indeed, its “center of gravity” [2].
When a user requests access to a resource, an entity called a reference monitor makes
a decision (either ‘allow’ or ‘deny’) in response. This process is called access enforcement.
We present an example of access enforcement in Figure 1.1. In the figure, the user issues
requests to read and write a file. The reference monitor mediates the two requests. It
allows the user to read the file, and denies the user the ability to write the file. To make
its decisions, the reference monitor consults an access control policy. In our example in
Figure 1.1, the policy presumably states that the user may read, but not write the file.
We consider access enforcement in the context of Role-Based Access Control(RBAC) [11].
RBAC is a syntax for policies, which is increasingly becoming the de-facto standard in en-
terprise settings. In RBAC, users are authorized to permissions via roles. In other words,
users are assigned to roles, and roles are assigned to permissions. In addition, roles may be







Figure 1.1: An example of access enforcement. Solid lines represent access requests. Dashed
lines represent the decision the reference monitor issues in response to access requests.
is an example of an RBAC policy. In the figure, Alice is authorized to the permission
Team Organization via the role Project Manager. As another example, Bob is authorized
to the permission Code Modification via the role Software Engineer, which inherits the role
Developer.
In RBAC, a user needs to initiate a session to access a resource. A session is associated
with a set of roles and provides a context in which a user exercises permissions. A request
is allowed if and only if one of the roles associated with the session is authorized to the
permission. We say that a role is authorized to a permission if there is a path from
the role to the permission in the RBAC policy when it is perceived as a graph. In the
RBAC example of Figure 1.2, Alice and Bob may initiate sessions sa and sb, respectively.
Alice may associate session sa with the role Software Engineer, which authorizes sa to the
permissions Project Planning and Code Modification. Similarly, Bob may associate session



















Figure 1.2: An Example RBAC policy. Users are shown in diamonds, roles in ovals and
permissions in rectangles. Edges represent user-role, role-role and role-permission assign-
ments. In the example, the user Alice is assigned to the role Project Manager and is
therefore authorized to the permission Team Organization. She is also authorized to the
role Developer, and therefore to Code Modification.
3
Figure 1.3: Access Enforcement Architecture
the permissions Project Planning, Code Modification, and Project Review.
Modern enterprises generate and archive large amounts of data. The proliferation
of data requires access control systems to scale to tens of thousands of resources and
permissions [8]. An important aspect of this scalability issue is the time-efficiency of access
enforcement. The size of the RBAC policy affects time-efficiency. An approach to the
problem is to distribute the reference monitor. With such an approach, a single, monolithic
reference monitor is no longer a performance bottleneck. Such distributed enforcement,
however, can be at odds with what is touted as one of the main benefits of RBAC — the ease
of administration. In RBAC systems, administration comprises changes to one of the three
assignments: the user-role, the role-role, and the role-permission assignment. In Figure 1.2,
we may assign Alice to the role IT Consultant. We may also remove the assignment of Bob
to the role Software Engineer. Such changes are examples of administration.
To reconcile the issues of time-efficiency and ease of administration, Wei et al. [32] have
proposed an architecture for distributed enforcement (see Figure 1.3). In the architecture,
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the Policy Decision Point (PDP) is the centralised component which maintains the RBAC
policy. The Policy Enforcement Points (PEPs) are distributed components that represent
the reference monitor. PEPs are aided by Secondary Decision Points (SDPs). An SDP can
be seen as a cache of a portion of the RBAC configuration from the PDP (see Chapter 2).
The question we seek to answer is: what are the data structure and associated algo-
rithms we should use in an SDP? There is evidence that “general purpose” approaches,
such as storing an access control policy in a database and using the querying capabilities
of the database, do not lend themselves to efficient access enforcement [6]. Consequently,
it is necessary to carefully consider the approach that is used.
Two data structures have been proposed in the literature for access enforcement in the
context of the architecture in Figure 1.3. They are: Authorization Recycling [32] and the
Cascade Bloom Filter [30]. In Authorization Recycling [32], we maintain two sets at the
SDP, Cache+ and Cache−. The entries in Cache+ are authorizations that are allowed, and
the entries in Cache− are authorizations that are disallowed. An access request is checked
against these sets (see section 2.2).The Cascade Bloom Filter [30] is used for encoding a
set A, and checking membership in A (see section 2.1).
Our objective is to provide a sound and reliable performance evaluation of the two data
structures in their use for distributed access enforcement. We consider the Bloom Filter [30]
in our assessment as well, as the Cascade Bloom Filter is an extension of the Bloom
Filter. The Bloom Filter [30] is a probabilistic time- and space-efficient data structure
for representing a set (see section 2.1). We address two challenges. One is to provide a
meaningful empirical assessment; this is recognized as a challenge in computing [25]. To
overcome this challenge, we evaluate the Bloom Filter, the Cascade Bloom Filter, and
Authorization Recycling using George et al’s approach [13] (see Section 4.1). Another
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challenge is the lack of a meaningful benchmark on which to base an assessment. To our
knowledge, the only benchmark that has been proposed in the context of RBAC is that of
Molloy et al [24]. They provide a benchmark for evaluating role mining algorithms. Their
benchmark is insufficient for our purposes as it does not comprise policies that have the
size and complexity that we expect in typical enterprise settings. We propose and justify
a benchmark that is drawn from prior work on RBAC in three different contexts, and is
therefore more comprehensive and realistic (see Chapter 3). Our evaluation shows that the
Cascade Bloom Filter is more efficient than the other two data structures for distributed
access enforcement in RBAC systems.
1.1 Objectives
The objective of the thesis is to provide a sound and reliable performance evaluation of
the Bloom Filter, the Cascade Bloom Filter, and Authorization Recycling. To achieve
this objective, we propose and justify a benchmark. We perform a statistically rigorous
evaluation of the three data structures. Based on our evaluation, we show that the Cascade
Bloom Filter outperforms both Authorization Recycling and the Bloom filter in terms of
time- and space-efficiency for distributed access enforcement in RBAC systems.
1.2 Organization of Thesis
The remainder of the thesis is organized as follows. In Chapter 2, we describe the three
data structures, their operation, and conduct a literature review. Chapter 3 presents a
description of the benchmark used for the evaluation. Chapter 4 presents the results of
6
the comparison of the three data structures. We conclude with Chapter 5, in which we
summarize and discuss future work.




As we discuss in Chapter 1, RBAC is a syntax for policies. An RBAC policy comprises
the triple 〈UA,PA,RH〉 where UA is the user-role assignment, PA is the permission-role
assignment, and RH is the role-hierarchy, which is a relation between roles.
There are three RBAC policies that show up in practice. They are: the Stanford Model,
the hybrid model, and Core-RBAC. In the Stanford model [11], roles are layered, and a role
at layer i directly inherits roles only in layer i+ 1, and is inherited directly only by roles in
layer i− 1 (or by users, for the topmost layer of roles). An example of the Stanford model
is shown in Figure 2.1. In the hybrid model, the role hierarchy is some partial ordering,
and not layered as in the Stanford model. An example of the hybrid model is shown in
Figure 2.2. A special case of the two models is when there is no role-role relationship. This
is called Core-RBAC [21, 24]. An example of Core-RBAC is shown in Figure 2.3.
A session is associated with a set of roles and provides a context in which a user
exercises permissions. We consider three session operations. They are: session initiation,
access request, and session deletion. Session initiation happens when a user associates a
8
Figure 2.1: Example of a RBAC Stanford model. Users are represented by diamonds, roles
by ovals, and permissions by rectangles. A role at layer i directly inherits roles only in
layer i+1, and is inherited directly only by roles in layer i−1. For example, Role1 inherits
Role4, but cannot inherit Role8 because Role 8 is not at a layer directly below Role4.
set of roles to a session he initiates. For example, as we discussed in Chapter 1, Alice may
associate session sa with the role Software Engineer, which authorizes sa to the permissions
Project Planning and Code Modification. An access request is generated when a user
exercises a permission in the context of a session. For example, in Figure 1.2, Alice may
exercise the permission Project Planning in the context of sa. Session deletion is the
removal of all information pertaining to the session. For example, removing session sa
results in prohibiting Alice the ability to exercise permissions in the context of sa.
As we discussed in Chapter 1, the SDP aids the PEP in making access decisions. Also,
the SDP can be seen as a cache of a portion of the RBAC configuration from the PDP,
which stores the RBAC policy. A user interacts with the architecture in Figure 1.3 by
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Figure 2.2: Example of a RBAC hybrid model. Users are represented by diamonds, roles
by ovals, and permissions by rectangles. A role can inherit any other role in the RBAC
policy, or it can inherit a permission. Users can inherit any role. Unlike the Stanford
model, there are no layers in the role-hierarchy
Figure 2.3: Example of a Core-RBAC model. Users are represented by diamonds, roles
by ovals, and permissions by rectangles. There is no role-role relationship in this model.
Every role inherits a permission, and every user inherits a role.
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performing session initiations, access requests, and session deletions. Therefore, the SDP
needs to perform the following four operations:
• Construct a data structure to store the data that is communicated from the PDP
• Make access decisions for each access request
• Remove the data associated with a deleted session
• Insert new data that is communicated from the PDP to the already-constructed data
structure
The following sections present three data structures that we implement at the SDP.
They are: the Bloom Filter (section 2.1), the Cascade Bloom Filter (section 2.1), and
Authorization Recycling (section 2.2). Section 2.3 summarizes the work that has been
done in research in the context of access enforcement and RBAC systems.
2.1 (Cascade) Bloom Filter
A Bloom filter [4] is a probabilistic time- and space-efficient data structure for encoding a
set A, and checking membership of an element e in A. We assume a universe, U , of which
A and e are a subset.
A Bloom filter B is an array of m bits, with indices 0 through m− 1. It is associated
with k hash functions h1, . . . , hk each of which maps every e ∈ U to some integer between
0 and m− 1.
To represent that e ∈ A, we set the bit to which each hi maps. To check whether e ∈ A,
we check whether the bit to which every hi maps is set. Figure 2.4 shows an example of
11
the Bloom Filter operations. In the figure, U is the set of words in a dictionary. A ⊂ U
where A = {when,where, what}. B is the Bloom Filter with m = 8 and k = 2. B encodes
elements of A. For encoding when, we get h1(when) = 0, h2(when) = 3. For where:
h1(where) = 3, h2(where) = 4. For what: h1(what) = 5, h2(what) = 7. We set the bit in
B to which every hi maps. The resulting B is [1, 0, 0, 1, 1, 1, 0, 1]. We check for membership
of e = when in B. Since all hi(e) bits are set, e is a member of A. For e = why, since bit
h2(why) = 1 is not set in B, e is not a member of A.
Removing an element from the Bloom Filter is not as efficient as adding one. Consider
the example in Figure 2.4. To remove e = when from B, an intuitive solution would
be to reset the bits at every hi(when). However, resetting bit h2(when) = 3 removes the
membership of e = where as well. The only solution is to reconstruct the Bloom Filter B by
encoding all elements of A (except e = when), which is not efficient. Therefore, a counting
Bloom Filter [10] makes removal from a Bloom Filter easier by associating a counter with
each index rather than a bit. Figure 2.5 is an example which reimplements the Bloom Filter
given in Figure 2.4 by using a counting Bloom Filter. Since h2(when) and h1(where) hash
to the same slot, the value of B at h2(when) = h1(where) is incremented twice. We remove
e = when by decrementing every value in B at hi(when). Since B[h2(when)] is nonzero
after removing e, the membership of where is not compromised.
As k and m are constants in the size of A (and U), B is represented in constant-space,
and we can check whether e ∈ A in constant time. However, this check can result in a false
positive; i.e., a check may return ‘true’ in some cases for which e 6∈ A. For example, in
Figure 2.4, a check to e = who where e 6∈ A may return ‘true’ if, for example, h1(who) = 3
and h2(who) = 5.Thus, e = who is a false positive. Consequently, a Bloom filter trades-off
a probability of false positives for time- and space-efficiency.
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Figure 2.4: Example of the Bloom Filter operation. Set U is the set of words of a dictionary.
A ⊂ U where A = {when,where, what}. B is the Bloom Filter with m = 8 and k = 2. B
encodes elements of A. e = when is a member of A since the bit in B at h1(when) = 0
and h2(when) = 3 is 1. However, e = why is not a member of A since the bit in B at
h2(why) = 1 is 0
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Figure 2.5: Example of the counting Bloom Filter operation, which reimplements the
Bloom Filter in Figure 2.4. Since h2(when) and h1(where) hash to the same slot, the
value of B at h2(when) = h1(where) = 3 is incremented twice.
The Cascade Bloom Filter [30] is an extension of the Bloom Filter. This data structure
uses several Bloom filters and associates each with a level, l ≥ 1. Let the set encoded
by the Bloom Filter at level i, Bi, be called Ai. Then, A0 = U , A1 = A, and for i > 1,
Ai comprises elements of Ai−2 that are false positives in Bi−1. False positives of Bl are
represented as a list.
We illustrate the operations of insertion, membership checking, and deletion performed
in the Cascade Bloom Filter with an example. Figure 2.6 shows an example of encoding
a set A = {when, where, what} in a Cascade Bloom Filter that uses 2 Bloom Filters.
The universe U contains the set of words {when, where, who, why, whom, what} where
A ⊂ U . B1 is the Bloom Filter at level 1 with m = 5 and k = 2. B2 is the Bloom Filter
at level 2 with m = 3 and k = 1. A1 and A2 are a subset of U that represent the set of
elements that are encoded in B1 and B2, respectively.
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Figure 2.6: Example of a Cascade Bloom Filter with two levels. Set U = {when, where,
who, why, whom, what}. A ⊂ U where A = {when,where, what}. B1 is the Bloom Filter
at level 1 with m = 5 and k = 2. B2 is the Bloom Filter at level 2 with m = 3 and
k = 1. B1 encodes elements of A1 where A1 = A. B2 encodes elements of A2 that are false
positives of B1. The explicit list contains the false positives of B2, which is the last Bloom
Filter in the Cascade
15
Insertion
To encode A in the Cascade, we set A1 = A. The resulting B1 is [1, 0, 2, 2, 1]. We
check for false positives in B1 that may occur from U − A1, where U − A = {who, why,
whom}. Since every hi of whom hashes to a nonzero value in B1, whom is a false positive.
Therefore, A2 = {whom}. We encode A2 in B2, resulting in B2 = [1, 0, 0]. We check for
false positives that may occur in B2 from the set S = A1 − A2. Since every hi of what
hashes to a nonzero value in B2, what is a false positive. Since the Cascade has 2 levels
only, we add the element e = what to the explicit list.
Checking for Membership
We check the membership of two elements: e = what, where e ∈ A, and e = whom,
where e 6∈ A. For e = what, we check the membership of e in B1. Since every hi of e
returns a nonzero value in B1, e is a member of B1. We check the membership of e in B2.
Since every hi of e returns a nonzero value in B2, e is a member of B2. Since e is in the
explicit list, and the number of levels in the Cascade is an even number, then e ∈ A. For
e = whom, the membership of e is satisfied in both Bloom Filters. However, e is not in
the explicit list. Since the number of levels in the Bloom Filter is even, and e is not in the
explicit list, then e 6∈ A.
Deletion
We delete the element e = what where e ∈ A. We remove membership of e from B1
by decrementing the value of every hi of e in B1. The resulting B1 is [1, 0, 2, 1, 0]. We
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check for every false positive in B1 that may no longer be a false positive. e = whom was
determined to be a false positive before removing e = what. Since h2(whom) = 4 maps
to 0 in B1, e = whom is not a member of the set A. Therefore, e = whom is not a false
positive. We remove membership of e = whom from B2, resulting in B2 = [0, 0, 0]. We
remove e = what from the explicit list.
In the next section, we present the algorithms we implement for insertion, checking
for membership, and deletion of the Cascade Bloom Filter. We present an algorithm to
construct the Cascade Bloom Filter, and we discuss whether a Cascade Bloom Filter exists
given the set A and U and the parameters m and k.
2.1.1 Algorithms
Algorithm 1 presents the algorithm taken from [30] for inserting an element into a Cascade
Bloom Filter. We note the following method:
InsertIntoCascadeBF(level, I, U’) – The algorithm takes as input the set I, repre-
senting the set to be added to the Cascade Bloom Filter. The set U ′ is the new
universe after adding I, where U ′ = U + I. level is the level of the Bloom Filter in
the Cascade. For each invocation, the method processes two levels at a time, an odd
level and the next even one. For each level, we maintain a set, Ai, that contains the
elements that are encoded in the Bloom Filter at level i. I is added to Alevel and
encoded in BFlevel in lines 24-29. After adding I in lines 24-29, we consider the next
even level. In this level, we add false positives resulting from elements added in the
odd level, and we remove false positives added previously that are no longer false
positives. The operation is done in lines 32-63. The algorithm recurses in lines 64-76
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to add elements to the remainder levels of the Cascade with the corresponding I and
U ′. The explicit list adds the final false positives in lines 15-22.
Algorithm 2 presents the algorithm taken from [30] for checking for membership of an
element in a Cascade Bloom Filter. We note the following method:
MemberCascadeBF(e) – This method takes as input the element e to be checked for
membership in the Cascade Bloom Filter. In Lines 7-15, we iterate through each level
of the Cascade. If, any any level, e returns false for its membership in the Bloom
Filter, we can make an inference about the membership of e in A. If the level is even,
then e ∈ A. Otherwise, e 6∈ A. If e returns true for its membership in each Bloom
Filter of the Cascade, we check the explicit list E holding the final false positives.
From lines 16-28, if the depth of the Cascade is even, and e ∈ E, then e ∈ A. If
e 6∈ E, then e 6∈ A. Otherwise, if the depth of the Cascade is odd, and e ∈ E, then
e 6∈ A. If e 6∈ E, then e ∈ A
Algorithm 3 presents the algorithm for removing an element from a Cascade Bloom
Filter. We note the following method:
RemoveFromCascadeBF(U’) – This method removes elements in the set U ′ from the
Cascade. We remove all elements in U ′ from the explicit list in lines 5-9. In lines
10-17, we remove membership of each element e in U ′ from all Bloom Filters in the
Cascade, and we remove membership of elements that are no longer false positives
from the Cascade in lines 18-30.
Algorithm 4 presents the algorithm taken from [30] for creating a Cascade Bloom Filter.
We note the following methods:
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Algorithm 1 An algorithm for inserting elements into a Cascade Bloom Filter
Operation InsertIntoCascadeBF(level, I, U’)
1: // Insert the elements of I into a Cascade Bloom Filter
2: // that represents A from universe U.
3: // The set U’ ⊇ U is the new universe
4: // It is first invoked with level = 1
5: // d is the depth of the Cascade Bloom Filter
6: // E is the explicit list
7:
8: if level is even or level > d + 1 then
9: return false
10: end if
11: if I 6⊆ U’ then
12: return false
13: end if
14: // If this layer is the last layer
15: if level = d + 1 then
16: for all e ∈ I do
17: if e 6∈ E then





23: // Add I to this layer
24: for all e ∈ I do
25: if e 6∈ Alevel then
26: add e to Alevel
27: encode e in BFlevel
28: end if
29: end for
30: // Now do the next level as well
31: // If this is the last layer
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32: if level = d then
33: for all e ∈ I do
34: if e ∈ E then
35: remove e from E
36: end if
37: end for
38: // Consider new false positives
39: F = U’ - (Alevel ∪ E)
40: for all e ∈ F do
41: if e is encoded in BFlevel then





47: // Remove false positives that are no longer so
48: for all e ∈ I do
49: if e ∈ Alevel+1 then
50: remove e from Alevel+1
51: remove e from BFlevel+1
52: end if
53: end for
54: // Add new false positives
55: F = U’ - (Alevel ∪ Alevel+1)
56: for all e ∈ F do
57: if e tests positive for membership in BFlevel+1 then
58: if e 6∈ Alevel+1 then
59: add e to Alevel+1




64: // Prepare for recursion
65: I’ = 0
66: Generate set to be inserted in Alevel+2
67: for all e ∈ Alevel do
68: if e tests positive for membership in BFlevel+1 then




72: U” = I’∪ Alevel+1
73: // Recurse
74: if I’ 6= 0 or U” 6= 0 then
75: InsertIntoCascadeBF(level + 2, I’, U”)
76: end if
Algorithm 2 An algorithm to verify membership of an element e in a set encoded in the
Cascade Bloom Filter
Operation MemberCascadeBF(e)
1: // BF is the Bloom Filter
2: // level is the level at which a BF is located in the Cascade
3: // E is the explicit list storing the final false positives of the
4: // cascade
5: // d is the depth of the Cascade Bloom Filter
6:
7: for level = 1 to d do
8: if e tests positive for membership in BFlevel then







16: if d is even then













Algorithm 3 An algorithm to remove membership of a set of elements from the Cascade
Operation RemoveFromCascadeBF(U’)
1: // U’ represents the set of elements to be removed from the Cascade
2: // E is the explicit list holding the final false positives
3: // d is the depth of the Cascade
4:
5: for all e ∈ U’ do
6: if e ∈ E then
7: remove e from E
8: end if
9: end for
10: for level = 1 to d do
11: for all e ∈ U’ do
12: if e ∈ Alevel then
13: remove e from Alevel




18: for level = 1 to d do
19: for all e ∈ Alevel+1 do
20: if e tests negative for membership in BFlevel then
21: remove e from Alevel+1





ConstructCascadeBF(A, U, m, Elen) – This method takes as input the set A to be
encoded, the universe U , the maximum number of counters for the Bloom Filters
m, and the maximum size of the explicit list Elen, which stores the final list of
false positives. The method invokes tryToConstruct, which attempts to create a
Cascade Bloom Filter with the given inputs mentioned previously.
tryToConstruct(level, depth, Asize, Usize, m, Elen) – This method tries to con-
struct a Bloom Filter at a specific level. It calculates the size of the Bloom Filter in
line 8, and the number of hashes in line 9. If newAsize ≤ Elen in line 13, then the
algorithm has successfully identified a Cascade Bloom Filter that can be constructed,
which is done by executing lines 14-16.
Existence of a Cascade Bloom Filter
Let L = {〈U,A,m, e〉 : there exists a Cascade Bloom Filter that encodes A ⊆ U with m
bits and an explicit list of size at most e}. We point out that it is likely that L 6∈ NP. The
reason is that the most natural certificate for an instance of L is a corresponding (instance
of a) Cascade Bloom Filter, which may have up to Θ(m) levels. As the input m can be
represented in log m bits, the resultant certificate is not polynomial in the size of the input.
We may assume, however, that the m bits and a list of size e are pre-allocated. We
correspondingly change our characterization of L to {〈U,A,m, e〉 : given m bits, a list E
with |E| = e, and A ⊆ U , there exists a Cascade Bloom Filter that encodes A with those
m bits and E}. Now, given some input, an algorithm has only to partition the m bits into
levels. We assume further that at each level of the Cascade Bloom Filter, the number of
hash functions is at most the number that minimizes the false positive rate for the Bloom
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Algorithm 4 An algorithm for creating a Cascade Bloom Filter
Operation ConstructCascadeBF(A, U, m, Elen)
1: // m is the total number of bits for Bloom Filters
2: // Elen is the maximum length of the explicit set E
3: // MAX DEPTH is the total depth of the Cascade (=1 for Bloom Filter)
4:
5: for depth = MAX DEPTH to 1 do
6: if tryToConstruct(1, depth, |A|, |U|, m, Elen) then
7: A0 = U
8: A1 = A
9: for level = 1 to depth do
10: for all e ∈ Alevel do
11: encode e in BFlevel
12: end for
13: for all e ∈ Alevel−1 − Alevel do
14: if e is a member of BFlevel then
15: if level = depth then
16: add e to E
17: else
18: encode e in BFlevel+1








Operation tryToConstruct(level, depth, Asize, Usize, m, Elen)
1: // Try to construct a Bloom Filter at level and below
2:
3: if m ≤ 0 then
4: return false
5: end if




7: for i = trials− 1 to 0 do
8: mi = (b mAsizec − i)× Asize
9: ki = round(ln2× miAsize)
10: εi = (1− e−ki×Asize/mi)ki
11: newAsize = dεi × (Usize− Asize)e
12: if level = depth then
13: if newAsize < Elen then
14: construct Bloom Filter of mi bits and ki hashes




19: if tryToConstruct(level + 1, depth, newAsize, newAsize + Asize, m - mi, Elen)
then








filter at that level. This is reasonable, as there are no benefits to using more hash functions
at a level.
For level i of the Cascade, let the number of hash functions be ki. Then we know that








ln 2 < m, where mi is the number of bits allocated
to level i, and Ai is the set encoded by the Bloom Filter at level i. Now, given some l =
〈U,A,m, e〉 ∈ L, and a certificate c for it that is a Cascade Bloom Filter, we know that
c is polynomial (linear) in the size of the input. Furthermore, an algorithm that verifies
that c is indeed a certificate for l simply checks that for every a ∈ U , the Cascade returns
‘true’ if and only if a ∈ A. For each a ∈ U , this algorithm runs in time O(|A| + m + e),
and therefore the entire algorithm is quadratic in the size of the input. We conclude that
L ∈ NP.
The exact complexity-class in which L lies is unknown as of the writing of this thesis.
2.1.2 Application in Access Control
Figure 2.7 shows a chronological process-flow for distributed access-enforcement in RBAC.
In Step 1, a user initiates a session at a PEP/SDP. The request to activate a session
propagates to the PDP, which makes the decision on whether it is allowed. If it is, in Step
2, the PDP communicates a data structure to the SDP that the latter uses in Steps 3, 4 and
5 to make decisions on access requests that pertain to that session, that are communicated
to it by the PEP.
The encoding of RBAC sessions in a Cascade Bloom Filter that has been proposed [30]
is as follows. Let S = {s1, . . . , sn} be the set of active sessions at a PEP-SDP, and P




1: Session initiation request
2: Access enforcement structure
3: Access request
5: Access decision







Figure 2.7: An architecture, reproduced from prior work [30, 32], for distributed access-
enforcement in RBAC, and an associated process-flow. Our focus is on the Access enforce-
ment (data) structure that is received by the SDP in Step 2, and that it uses to make
access decisions.
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is S × P , and A is the smaller (in cardinality) of Ap = {〈s, p〉 : s is authorized to p} and
An = {〈s, p〉 : s is not authorized to p}. A negation bit indicates which of Ap or An the
Cascade Bloom Filter encodes. The Bloom Filter is a special case of the Cascade Bloom
Filter, with the number of levels, l = 1. We adopt the same encoding of RBAC sessions
for the Bloom Filter as the Cascade Bloom Filter.
2.1.3 Example
Figure 2.8 is an example of using the Cascade Bloom Filter. In the figure, Alice and Bob
initiate sessions 〈sa, {Software Engineer}〉 and 〈sb, {Software Engineer, IT Consultant}〉,
respectively. Therefore, U = {sa, sb} × { Project Planning, Code Modification, Project
Review}, Ap = {〈sa, Project Planning 〉, 〈sa, Code Modification 〉, 〈sb, Project Planning
〉, 〈sb, Code Modification 〉, 〈sb, Project Review 〉}, An = U − Ap. Since |Ap| > |An|, the
Cascade Bloom Filter contains the set of negative authorizations (the negation bit is set).
The Cascade Bloom Filter has 2 levels. Bloom Filter B1 is at level 1 with m = 5 and
k = 3. Bloom Filter B2 is at level 2 with m = 3 and k = 2. We encode An in B1, which
results in B1 = {1, 0, 2, 0, 0}. We check for false positives in B1. Since B1 is nonzero at
every hi(e) where e = {〈sb, Project Review 〉}, then e is a false positive of B1. We encode
e in B2, which results in B2 = {0, 2, 0}. We check for false positives in B2. Since B2 is
nonzero at every hi(e) where e = {〈sa, Project Review 〉}, then e is a false positive of B2.
Therefore, the explicit list A3 = {〈sa, Project Review 〉}.
If Alice exercises the permission Project Review in the context of sa, we check the
membership of e = {〈sa, Project Review 〉} in every Bloom Filter of the Cascade. Since all
Bloom Filters return a nonzero value, we check the explicit list. Since the Cascade Bloom
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Session Initiations:
 Alice: <sa, {Software Engineer}>
 Bob: <sb, {Software Engineer, IT Consultant}>
Cascade Bloom Filter:
 B1: Bloom Filter at level 1. m = 5, k = 3
 B2: Bloom Filter at level 2. m = 3, k = 2
Figure 2.8: Example of using a Cascade Bloom Filter with 2 levels for sessions sa and sb
initiated by Alice and Bob, respectively, for the RBAC policy in Figure 1.2. We assume
that three hash functions are used for Level 1, and two are used for Level 2. The Negation
Bit is set, which indicates that A1 is the set of authorizations that are disallowed. A2 is
the set of false positives in B1, and A3 ⊆ A1 is the set of false positives in B2, which is the
explicit list.
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Filter contains an even number of layers and the negation bit is set, e 6∈ A. Therefore, the
access is disallowed.
2.2 Authorization Recycling
In Authorization recycling [32], we maintain two sets, Cache+ and Cache−. Cache+ stores
the tuple 〈R, p〉 where R represents the set of roles that are authorized to the permission
p. Cache− stores one entry 〈R, p〉 where every r ∈ R is not authorized to the permission p.
2.2.1 Application in Access Control
Figure 2.9 shows a chronological process-flow for distributed access-enforcement in RBAC.
In Step 1, a user initiates a session at a PEP/SDP. The user requests a permission in step
2. The request may propagate to the PDP if the SDP cannot make an access decision.
The PDP communicates a data structure to the SDP in step 3 that the latter uses to make
decisions on access requests in steps 2, 4 and 5. The SDP updates the two sets it maintains
when it receives the data structure from the PDP.
In Figure 2.9, access enforcement is performed as follows. When a user exercises a
permission p, the SDP performs one of the following actions:
• Returns Denied.
• Returns Allowed.
• The SDP is Undecided. It requests more information from the PDP to make an
access decision and updates Cache+ and Cache−.
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Figure 2.9: An architecture, reproduced from prior work [30, 32], for distributed access-
enforcement in RBAC, and an associated process-flow. A request propagates to the PDP
only when the SDP cannot make an access decision in step 2. This is shown as a dashed
line. Our focus is on the Access enforcement (data) structure that is received by the SDP
in Step 3, and that it uses to make access decisions. The difference between this and
Figure 2.6 is that the SDP communicates with the PDP when an access request is made,
instead of at session initiation.
31
When a user exercises the permission p in the context of a session where a set of
roles R has been specified, the SDP returns Denied if R ⊆ R− where 〈R−, p〉 ∈ Cache−.
Likewise, the SDP returns Allowed if R ⊇ R+ where 〈R+, p〉 ∈ Cache+. If neither of the
previous conditions is satisfied, the SDP cannot make a final decision. Therefore the SDP
requests more information from the PDP to make an access decision and update Cache+
and Cache−.
2.2.2 Algorithms
Algorithm 5 is an algorithm taken from [32] for performing access decisions by the SDP
when a user exercises a permission. We note the following methods:
EvaluateRequest(r, p) – This method takes as input the set of roles r the user specifies
at session initiation and the permission p he exercises. The access request is denied if
r ⊆ R− where 〈R−, p〉 ∈ Cache− (lines 6-7). The request is allowed if r ⊇ R+ where
〈R+, p〉 ∈ Cache+ (lines 8-9). If no decision can be made, the SDP first communicates
with the PDP, and then makes a decision. The method AddResponse(r, p) updates
the sets maintained by the SDP (lines 10-11).
AddResponse(r, p) – This method is called by the SDP to update its sets when it is
undecided about the access request. It takes as input the set of roles r the user
specifies at session initiation, and the permission p he exercises in the context of a
session. In lines 1-7, if none of the roles the user specifies at session initiation is
authorized to the permission he exercises, the roles are added to Cache− and each of
those roles is removed from the entry in Cache+ where it is authorized to p. In lines
32
Figure 2.10: Example of access enforcement using Authorization Recycling. Alice and
Bob initiate sessions 〈sa , {Software Engineer}〉 and 〈sb , {Software Engineer, IT Con-
sultant}〉, respectively. The order of access requests is as follows: ({Software Engineer},
Code Modification), ({Software Engineer}, Team Organization), and ({Software Engineer,
IT Consultant}, Code Modification). Cache+ and Cache− are updated for each request.
Alice and Bob are allowed to exercise the permission Code Modification, but Alice is not
allowed to exercise the permission Team Organization
8-12, if any role in r is authorized to p, each role is added to Cache+ if and only if
there is no entry in Cache− that contains a mapping of that role to p.
RemoveSession(s) – This method is called when a session s is deleted. The method
takes session s as input. R is the set of roles associated with s. In lines 3-11, if r ∈ R
and r was activated by session s only, then r is removed from Cache+ or Cache−.
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Algorithm 5 An algorithm for making access decisions and updating Cache+ and Cache−
when an access request or a session deletion is performed using Authorization Recycling
Operation EvaluateRequest(r, p)
1: // r is the set of roles a user specifies when he initiates a session
2: // p is the permission the user exercises
3: // R+ is the set of roles in Cache+ that are authorized to p
4: // R− is the set of roles in Cache− that are not authorized to p
5:
6: if r ⊆ R−, where (R−, p) ∈ Cache− then
7: return deny
8: else if there exists (R+, p) ∈ Cache+ s.t. R+ ⊆ r then
9: return allow
10: else
11: the SDP is undecided. The SDP communicates with the PDP to finalise its
12: decision and updates its sets
13: end if
Operation AddResponse(r, p)
1: if all roles in r are not authorized to p then
2: replace each (R+, p) ∈ Cache+ with (R+ - r, p)
3: if (R−, p) ∈ Cache− then
4: replace it with (r ∪ R−, p)
5: else
6: add (R, p) to Cache−
7: end if
8: else
9: find (R−, p) ∈ Cache−
10: delete all (R+, p) ∈ Cache+ s.t. r - R− ⊆ R+
11: add (r - R−, p) to Cache+
12: end if
Operation RemoveSession(s)
1: // s is the session initiated
2: // R is the set of roles associated with session s
3: for all r ∈ R do
4: if r was activated by session s only then
5: if r ∈ Cache+ then
6: remove r from Cache+
7: else






Figure 2.10 shows an example of using Authorization Recycling for access enforcement. In
the figure, Alice and Bob initiate sessions 〈sa , {Software Engineer}〉 and 〈sb , {Software
Engineer, IT Consultant}〉, respectively. Alice requests the permissions Code Modification
and Team Organization in the context of sa, and Bob requests the permission Code Mod-
ification in the context of sb. Since no information is available in Cache
+ and Cache− for
the first request, the information is retrieved from the PDP, 〈{Software Engineer}, Code
Modification 〉 is added to Cache+, and the request is allowed. For the second request, no
information is available in both sets for the permission Team Organization. After consult-
ing with the PDP, the SDP adds 〈{Software Engineer}, Team Organization 〉 to Cache−.
For the final request, Bob is allowed to exercise the permission Code Modification, since
{Software Engineer, IT Consultant} ⊆ {Software Engineer}.
2.3 Related Work
There is a large amount of research in distributed access control, and in distributed RBAC
in particular. However, there is relatively little work on efficient access enforcement in
these contexts. To our knowledge, CPOL [6] is the state of the art in access enforcement
in distributed settings. CPOL employs caching and a structure called an AccessToken
that is application-specific to speed-up access enforcement. The work on CPOL points out
also that simply using database querying does not suffice for fast access enforcement. Our
work is close also to those of Wei et al. [32], Tripunitara and Carbunar [30] and Liu et
al. [21], that address the access enforcement problem in RBAC. Wei et al. [32] propose the
architecture that we adopt in this paper (see Figure 1.3). In that context, they propose
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Authorization Recycling which is one of the data structures that we assess. Tripunitara
and Carbunar [30] adopt the architecture of Wei et al. [32] and propose an approach called
the Cascade Bloom Filter for access checking. Their focus is fast and space efficient access
checking for RBAC in low-capability devices. Liu et al. [21] propose a technique that they
call transformations for access checking in RBAC.
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Chapter 3
Categorization of RBAC Policies and
Session Profiles in our Benchmark
We have devised a benchmark for access enforcement in RBAC systems. We categorize
two components in our benchmark: RBAC policies (section 3.1) and session profiles (sec-
tion 3.2). We present datasets for RBAC policies and session profiles.
3.1 RBAC Policy
We generate and create new RBAC policies based on prior work and experience with RBAC
deployments that have been documented in books and the research literature. We present
a summary of datasets for RBAC policies in Table 3.1. We categorize RBAC policies along
the following axes:
Source We have two sources of datasets: “Literature”, and “Synthetic”. Datasets from
Literature are documented works of RBAC policies that researchers have used in their
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1000-1999 200 1000-3500 Constant (range) to
2000-2999 100 100-2000 Stanford to roles, Constant
3000-3999 200-250 1500-11000 Hybrid (range) to permissions,
5000-6000 200 1500-2000 Core Distributions (e.g.,




Table 3.1: RBAC Policy Categorization.
publications. We classify our sources from Literature into three categories:
1. Top-down design of RBAC policies [11, 17, 18, 27]
2. Role mining and engineering [5, 12, 15, 23, 24, 31, 34, 35]
3. Evaluation of approaches to access-enforcement [21, 30, 32]
We create new RBAC policies based on ones from the literature, which we call Synthetic
policies.
Number of users, roles and permissions The numbers of users, roles and permissions are
typically co-dependant in RBAC policies from the literature. We point out the following
observations from Table 3.1:
• The number of roles grow as a step function with respect to the number of users.
• The number of permissions range from a fraction of the number of users to a somewhat
significant multiple.
The second observation stems from the fact that RBAC is deployed in one of two contexts.
One is for high-level policies in which permissions are abstract. Another is at a much lower
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level, in which resources that are protected are individual files or email messages; in such
systems, there can be a considerable number of permissions. (It is common for a permission
to be a pair 〈o, r〉, where o is the object or resource that is protected, and r is a privilege
or right. However, this is not the only encoding as a permission that is meaningful; see,
for example, the work of Crampton [9].)
We consider Synthetic datasets that have not been considered in Literature. Literature
datasets extend to 40000 users only. However, an enterprise can have up to 1.6 million
employees [1]. We anticipate that such enterprises will want to model each employee as
an RBAC user. We also anticipate that the number of roles will be in the same proportion
to the number of users as for the largest range for users from the literature. Therefore, our
Synthetic dataset includes users up to 1.6 million where they can be assigned to the same
proportion of roles as described in the Literature source. We do not anticipate, however,
that the number of permissions will increase significantly. Consequently, we adopt for
permissions similar numbers as the largest ranges from the literature.
Role Hierarchy (RH) and connectivity In Table 3.1, we consider three categories for the
structure of RBAC policies. They are: RH Depth, RH Model, and Connectivity. RH
Depth is the number of layers in the role-hierarchy. In our survey of the literature, the RH
Depth does not exceed 5.
We consider three RH Models: Stanford, Hybrid and Core. In the Stanford model [11],
roles are layered, and a role at layer i directly inherits roles only in layer i + 1, and is
inherited directly only by roles in layer i− 1 (or by users, for the topmost layer of roles).
The Stanford model arises in the top-down design of RBAC policies. Realizing the Stanford
model in an enterprise typically results in 4 or 5 layers of roles [11]. The hybrid model arises
in both the top-down design of RBAC policies and in role mining. In the hybrid model,
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the role hierarchy is some partial ordering, and not layered as in the Stanford model. A
special case of the two models is when there is no role-role relationship. This is called Core
RBAC and arises in role mining [21, 24].
Algorithm 6 is an algorithm we have designed and implemented to generate RBAC
policies for our benchmark. We note the following method:
RBACPolicy(nu, nr, np, dr, nrh, rc, uc, pc) – this method takes as input the num-
ber of users (nu), roles (nr), and permissions (np), the depth (dr) and nature (nrh)
of the role-hierarchy, the role (rc), user (uc), and permission (pc) connectivity. In
line 15, we divide the roles into layers according to dr and each layer has nr/dr roles.
Lines 18-60 construct the RBAC policy by connecting each element according to the
criteria specified at the inputs. Users, roles, and permissions can be connected either
randomly, or uniformly, in a Stanford style model, or Hybrid. If the depth is 1, then
the RBAC model is Core.
3.2 Session Profile
There is some prior work which has datasets on session profiles [21, 30, 33]. We augment
those datasets with our own.
We consider three categories in our session profiles: sessions, role activation, and access
requests; we summarize these categories in Table 3.2.
Sessions The total number of session initiations can vary from a fraction of the number of
users to a multiple since a user may initiate more than one session. However, the number
of active sessions is less than or equal to the total number of session initiations. By active
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Algorithm 6 An algorithm for generating different RBAC policies
Operation RBACPolicy(nu, nr, np, dr, nrh, rc, uc, pc)
1: // nu is the total number of users represented in the RBAC policy
2: // nr is the total number of roles in the RBAC policy
3: // np is the total number of permissions in the RBAC policy
4: // dr is the depth of the role-hierarchy. It is 1 for Core-RBAC and
5: // > 1 for Stanford and Hybrid models
6: // nrh is the nature of role-hierarchy. It is either Stanford or Hybrid
7: // rc is the number of elements a role is assigned to. It is either
8: // random or uniform
9: // uc is is the number of roles a user is assigned to. It is either
10: // random or uniform
11: // pc is is the number of permissions a role gets assigned to. It is
12: // either random or uniform
13:
14: We arrange roles in layers where the number of layers is dr and the
15: number of roles in each layer is nr/dr
16:
17: if rc is random then
18: if nrh is Stanford then
19: Each role at a specific layer is assigned to roles at a layer
20: directly below it randomly
21: else if nrh is Hybrid then
22: Each role at a specific layer is assigned to roles at any layer
23: below it randomly
24: end if
25: else if rc is uniform then
26: if nrh is Stanford then
27: Each role at a specific layer is assigned to roles at a layer
28: directly below it uniformly
29: else if nrh is Hybrid then
30: Each role at a specific layer is assigned to roles at any layer
31: below it uniformly
32: end if
33: end if
34: if uc is random then
35: if nrh is Stanford then
36: Each user is assigned random roles which are at the higest layer.
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37: else if nrh is Hybrid then
38: Each user is assigned random roles which are at any layer.
39: end if
40: else if uc is uniform then
41: if nrh is Stanford then
42: Each user is assigned uniform roles which are at the higest layer.
43: else if nrh is Hybrid then
44: Each user is assigned uniform roles which are at any layer.
45: end if
46: end if
47: if pc is random then
48: if nrh is Stanford then
49: Each role at the lowest layer is assigned random permissions
50: else if nrh is Hybrid then
51: Each role at any layer is assigned random permissions
52: end if
53: else if pc is uniform then
54: if nrh is Stanford then
55: Each role at the lowest layer is assigned uniform permissions
56: else if nrh is Hybrid then





Sessions i. Total number of session initiations varies
ii. Number of active sessions varies
Role Activation i. Number of roles to be activated varies
ii. Activate roles sharing the same
permission at varying rates.
iii. Activate roles at different levels
of the role hierarchy.
iv. Mutually exclusive roles are not
activated at the same time.
Access Requests i. Number of access requests varies
ii. Perform access requests on random permissions
available in the RBAC configuration.
iii. Positive permissions are accessed more often.
Table 3.2: Session Profile Categorization
sessions, we mean sessions that have not been deleted yet after initiation. If the number
of active sessions is reached, a fixed number of access requests is performed in the context
of an active session. If the number of access requests is reached, we initiate new sessions.
We repeat the process until the total number of session initiations is reached.
Role Activation For each session we initiate, the set of roles to we activate can either share
the same permission, be located at different levels of the role hierarchy, or they could be
roles that do not share the same parent role. In the latter case, roles are mutually exclusive
in accordance to the concept of Separation of Duty [11].
Access Requests There is a fixed number of access requests performed in the context of
active sessions. Access requests can either be performed on random permissions; or they
can be performed on permissions for which the user is allowed to only since we anticipate
that in most of the cases, users tend to request permissions for which they are allowed to
more often.
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Algorithm 7 is an algorithm we have implemented to generate session profiles for specific
RBAC policies for our benchmark. We note the following method:
SessionProfile(ns, nsa, nrs, nr, nua, naa) – this method takes as input the number
of sessions (ns), sessions per access request (nsa), roles per session (nrs), access
requests (nua), and the nature of roles (nr) and access requests (naa). We record
session initiations that may happen in lines 23-38 by activating nrs number of roles,
which are determined according to nr. In lines 10-19, we record access requests to
permissions, which are determined according to naa. Access requests happen when
nsa is reached. We record the deletion of sessions if the number of active sessions is
larger than nsa in lines 20-22, or if active sessions remain after ns is reached in line
41.
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Algorithm 7 An algorithm for generating different session profiles for specific RBAC
policies
Operation SessionProfile(ns, nsa, nrs, nr, nua, naa)
1: // ns is the number of sessions we initiate
2: // nsa is the number of sessions per access request
3: // nrs is the number of roles per session that we activate
4: // nr is the nature of roles.
5: // nua is the number of access requests we perform
6: // naa is the nature of access requests.
7:
8: count = 0
9: for i = 1 to ns do
10: if count = nsa then
11: // perform access requests
12: for j = 1 to nua do
13: if naa = 0 then
14: perform access requests to all permissions
15: else if naa = 1 then
16: perform access requests to permissions a user is allowed to exercise
17: end if
18: end for
19: record the access request with the permission and session
20: else if count > nsa then
21: delete one of the sessions created previously, and record it
22: count−−
23: else
24: // perform a session initiation and activate a set of roles according
25: // to nr
26: for j = i to nrs do
27: if nr = 0 then
28: activate roles that share the same permissions only
29: else if nr = 1 then
30: activate roles at different levels of the role-hierarchy
31: else if nr = 2 then
32: activate some junior roles but not all, making sure to not activate
33: parent roles which would activate other junior roles in order to








41: record the deletion of the remaining active sessions.
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Chapter 4
Evaluation of the three Data
Structures
We implement a benchmark for RBAC policies and session profiles based on the catego-
rization given in Chapter 3. We perform a statistically rigorous evaluation for the three
data structures used by the SDP in Figure 1.3, and we compare the results.
Section 4.1 presents Georges et al’s [13] approach that we use to evaluate the three data
structures, and section 4.2 summarizes the evaluation results.
4.1 Evaluation Methodology
Meaningful empirical assessment is a significant challenge in computing [25]. For Java
programs, non-determinism in making empirical observations can result from various fac-
tors, such as dynamic compilation and garbage collection. The methodology we adopt
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overcomes such non-determinism and is statistically rigorous. It is based on the work of
Georges et al. [13].
Java programs run within an instance of a Virtual Machine (VM). We collect the average
time across multiple VM invocations, as there can be variation across such invocations.
Within a VM invocation, we need to avoid skew from the effects of starting up the VM and
reach what is called steady-state [13]. For each VM invocation, we determine the number
of benchmark iterations that we need to perform by finding at least k consecutive steady-
state values for which the coefficient of variation (CoV) is less than some preset value (we
have chosen 2%). The value of k starts at some value (4, in our case) and increases so long
as the CoV decreases, up to the threshold. We record the mean of the k values for each
VM invocation. Our final benchmark time is the mean across all VM invocations.
To minimize the effects from garbage collection, we keep the heap size constant across
VM invocations. Apart from the mean, we also compute confidence intervals. Our ob-
jective is for the confidence intervals to not overlap, which guarantees that with a certain
confidence (95%, in our case), we can assert that the two values are statistically distinct.
All the values we report and graph are statistically distinct from other values.
Algorithm 8 is an algorithm we have implemented to collect the evaluation results using
Georges et al’s [13] approach. We note the following methods:
Measurements(rp, sp, I, ds, k) – the method takes as input the RBAC policy (rp),
the session profile generated for that policy (sp), the number of benchmark iterations
(I), the data structure we intend to evaluate (ds), and the number of initial steady
state values we intend to record (k). In lines 14-17, we calculate the mean of k timing
measurements. In lines 19-23, we calculate the standard deviation of the k measure-
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ments. In lines 25-32, we calculate the CoV to determine if the k measurements
represent steady state values for I iterations. If they do, we record the mean of the
k measurements. We increment k and collect new steady state values if the CoV can
be minimized with a larger k. We record a new mean if k can be incremented to lead
to a lower CoV.
ConfIntervals(means) – this method takes as input the means that we record for each
VM invocation of the method Measurements. In lines 5-9, we evaluate the mean of
all VM invocation measurements. In Lines 11-15, we calculate the standard deviation
of the measurements, and we calculate the confidence invervals in lines 17-19.
We have conducted our experiments on an isolated Intel dual core E8400 PC that runs
at 3 GHz, has 3.5 Gbytes of RAM and runs the Ubuntu Linux operating system. Our Java
version is 1.6.0 18, and we run the OpenJDK Runtime Environment.
4.2 Comparison of Final Results
The interface we use to represent the architecture in Figure 1.3 is implemented in Java
by Komlenovic [19]. Section 4.2.1 and section 4.2.2 present an analysis of the time- and
space-efficiency of the three data structures.
4.2.1 Time Efficiency
We present our results for time efficiency in Table 4.1. In each dataset we have 2500 users,
each authorized to different numbers of roles and permissions. We have 100 roles in total,
and 100 permissions.
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Algorithm 8 An algorithm for finding k consecutive steady state values when evaluating
a data structure for the lowest possible CoV starting from 0.02 and I iterations for each
VM invocation, then evaluating the mean and confidence intervals of m VM invocations
Operation Measurements(rp, sp, I, ds, k)
1: // rp is the RBAC policy used in our evaluation
2: // sp is the session profile generated for rp
3: // I is the total number of benchmark iterations
4: // ds is the data structure, which is either Authorization Recycling,
5: // the Bloom Filter, or the Cascade Bloom Filter
6: // k is the number of steady state values
7:
8: we calculate and record time1 . . . timeI where timei is the total access request time
when using ds for rp and sp
9:
10: CoV tmp = 0.02
11: for i = I to 1 do
12: mean = 0
13: // calculate the mean
14: for j = 0 to k do
15: mean = mean + timei−j
16: end for
17: mean = mean
k
18: // calculate the standard deviation
19: stdev = 0
20: for j = 0 to k do







24: // calculate the minimum possible coefficient of variation
25: CoV = stdev
mean
26: if CoV < CoVtmp then
27: record mean, or overwrite the previous recorded mean












1: // means is the set of means mean1 . . .meanm where meani the
2: // output of the ith VM invocation to Measurements
3:
4: // calculate the mean
5: mean = 0
6: for i = 1 to m do
7: mean = mean + meani
8: end for
9: mean = mean
m
10: // calculate the standard deviation
11: stdev = 0
12: for i = 1 to m do







16: // calculate for 95% confidence intervals
17: interval = 1.96× stdev√
m
18: lower interval = mean - interval
19: upper interval = mean + interval
Auth. Bloom Cas. Bl.
recycl. filter filter
Bursty
Stanford 2928.80 56.03 18.07
Hybrid 94.07 60.15 32.40
Core 10.18 50.41 29.94
Uniform
Stanford 1220.43 53.73 22.00
Hybrid 49.73 55.57 25.54
Core 4.44 55.62 26.16
Table 4.1: Average access request times in µs. The averages are across number of total
session initiations from 2 through 15, for a given RBAC policy that comprises 2500 users,
100 roles and 100 permissions. For the Stanford RBAC policy, we have adopted 5 layers,
which is the maximum in Table 3.1. For the Hybrid RBAC policy, the depth varies between
1 to 5. We give the standard deviations for the bursty case in Figure 4.1.
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Our objective is to understand the behavior of each data structure as we vary the
number of sessions and sessions per access request. Consequently, we consider from 2
through 15 sessions, and both bursty and uniform arrivals for the sessions. By bursty
arrival, we mean that session initiations are interspersed with relatively long “quiet” periods
in which we have no session initiation. In the interim, we have access requests for the
sessions that exist. In uniform session arrival, session initiations are uniformly interspersed
with access requests. We conjecture that bursty arrivals are likely with sessions that are
directly used by humans, and uniform arrivals are possible if there are automated processes
with which sessions are associated. The results are displayed in Figure 4.1.
We vary three parameters in our experiments: the number of roles per session, the
number of permissions per session and the nature of RH (Stanford, Hybrid and Core).
Figures 4.1 shows the impact of the last attribute on time efficiency, and 4.2 shows average
access request times in µs for Core RBAC, for which the number of roles and permissions
range from small (10) to large (10,000). Such numbers are consistent with Table 3.1.
We give an analytical summary of the results we have generated in the following sec-
tions.
Number of Sessions per Access Request (Bursty vs. Uniform)
We observe from Table 4.1 that none of the data structures, except Authorization Re-
cycling, is impacted by the session arrival rate (burst vs. uniform). The reason is that
in Authorization Recycling, all the work is during access request; session initiation does
not involve any exchange from the PDP to the SDP (except validation of the initiation).
Consequently, Authorization Recycling can be impacted by bursty session arrival, which
results in a number of access requests in short periods.
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Total Number of Sessions
The graphs in Figure 4.1 show the impact of the number of sessions on each data structure.
We observe that all three data structures are resilient to an increase in the number of
sessions from the standpoint of time-efficiency. That is, the access request time does not
necessarily grow with the number of sessions. We expect this to be the case, so long as
the PEP/SDP is not stressed by adding too many sessions. None of the data structures
has an access request algorithm whose time-complexity is parameterized by the number of
sessions.
It is not our objective to stress a PEP/SDP by considering large numbers of sessions. In-
deed, the number of sessions a PEP/SDP can support without significant impact on its per-
formance depends on its resources such as hardware. Our objective is gain broader insights
into the three data structures, notwithstanding the resources available to a PEP/SDP, as-
suming some realistic model of computation (the “Random-Access Machine” model, for
example [7]).
Efficiency
The Cascade Bloom Filter and the Bloom Filter are time-efficient data structures. The
major overhead with them is the computation of the hash function (in our implementation,
this is the cryptographic hash function, SHA-1 [29]), and searching a set in the worst case.
Authorization Recycling is efficient for Core-RBAC, but its performance degrades when
we add a hierarchy. The reason is that the first time a permission is accessed, the SDP
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Figure 4.1: Average access request times in µs and the corresponding standard deviations




By jitter, we mean the variation in access request times as the number of sessions changes.
We can quantify this as the percentage error in the mean; that is, the ratio of the standard
deviation to the mean. We observe from Figure 4.1 that this is quite high for the Cascade
and Bloom Filter, and very high for the Stanford RH for Authorization Recycling. The
Cascade and Bloom filter are affected by the heterogeneity of the permissions; if the union
of permissions to which all sessions are authorized is larger, this can result in a deeper
Cascade or a larger set of false positives that must be maintained explicitly. Authorization
Recycling is affected by the heterogeneity of the roles that a user may activate in a session.
In our datasets, a user is directly assigned to the same number of roles across each of the
Stanford, Hybrid and Core policies. Consequently, there is more heterogeneity in the roles
that a user may activate in the Stanford policy than in the other two.
Role Hierarchy (Stanford vs. Hybrid vs. Core)
Table 4.1 and the graphs in Figure 4.1 show the impact of Stanford vs. Hybrid vs. Core as
the choice for RH. Only for Authorization Recycling do we see an impact from the choice
of RH. A deeper RH gives a user more choices of roles he may activate during session
initiation. This is reflective of our dataset – a user is directly assigned to the same number
of roles for all three of the Stanford, Hybrid and Core RBAC policies. However, in the
Stanford policy, he is authorized to more roles as a result of the deep RH. Consequently,
the size of Cache− and Cache+ is larger.
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Figure 4.2: Time-efficiency for small (10) to large (10,000) numbers of roles and permissions
in a session. In the lower graph, we do not plot Authorization Recycling as the numbers
are much larger than the ones for the other data structures.
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Scalability
We observe from Figure 4.2 that Authorization Recycling fares somewhat poorly as we
need to store almost every role for each permission, and this results in it being linear in
the number of roles. For the Cascade and the Bloom Filter, the time for access request is
independent of the number of roles in a session. In this respect, they scale well with the
number of roles.
The Cascade and the Bloom Filter scale well also with the number of permissions, as
Figure 4.2 indicates. Also, for the the optimal values of the number of indices and the
number of hash functions changes with the number of permissions. (It may decrease for
the Cascade Bloom filter owing to the negation bit.) Notwithstanding this, up to 10,000
permissions, these issues appear to have no tangible impact on the time efficiency of these
data structures. We do not plot Authorization Recycling in the graph for permissions in
Figure 4.2 as the numbers for it are much higher than for the other data structures. It
scales poorly with the number of permissions, as the number of entries in the two sets is
linear in the number of permissions in a session.
4.2.2 Space Efficiency
In this section, we analyze the space-efficiency of the three data structures. We base our
assessment on what we have observed from our implementations, and an analysis of the
algorithms we implement.
Authorization Recycling is linear in the number of sessions. However, it can be quadratic
in the number of roles and permissions, in the worst case. The reason is that an entry in
the Cache− or Cache+ is a role set-permission pair.
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The Bloom Filter and the Cascade Bloom Filter are non-constant in space relative to
the number of sessions and the number of permissions per session. The reason is that the
optimal values for the number of indices and the number of hash functions changes with
the number of sessions and permissions. For the Cascade Bloom Filter, the number of
indices may decrease with an increase in the number of sessions or permissions per session
as a consequence of the negation bit (see Section 2.1 and Figure 2.8). Consequently, the
relationship between space and the number of sessions or permissions per session is a step
function. The Cascade and the Bloom Filter are agnostic to the number of roles per session.
In Figure 4.3, we present graphs that capture the above discussion. The graphs have
been generated based on our implementations.
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Figure 4.3: Space inefficient (upper figure) vs. space efficient (lower figure) data structures




We have provided a sound and reliable performance evaluation of the Bloom Filter, the
Cascade Bloom Filter, and Authorization Recycling for distributed access enforcement in
RBAC systems. The following sections are organized as follows: Section 5.1 summarizes
our evaluation results, and section 5.2 presents possible improvements that could be done
in the context of access enforcement.
5.1 Summary
The Cascade Bloom Filter is more efficient than the Bloom Filter and Authorization Re-
cycling. We observe from Figures 4.1 and 4.2 that the Cascade is the most time-efficient
implementation. It is resilient to changes in the number of sessions, and the number of
roles and permissions per session. We observe from Figure 4.3 that the Cascade is the most
space-efficient implementation as the number of sessions increases. Therefore, we conclude




Real world enterprises may comprise a large number of users that scales to more than a
million. We anticipate that these enterprises will implement an RBAC model to perform
access enforcement. As hardware capabilities improve, it is essential to evaluate the three
data structures for a larger number of users, roles and permissions, and for different hard-
ware configurations. The existence of the Cascade Bloom Filter that encodes any possible
set needs to be proved. We need to broaden our benchmark by considering different hard-
ware models for our evaluation. Finally, we need to perform our evaluation by stressing
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